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1Is Electronic Cash Possible?
Abstract
Cash-like payments in electronic commerce and at the traditional point of sale are ex-
pected to be beneficial, e.g., because of privacy protection, low transaction costs, and
irrevocability. Therefore, we discuss how to design electronic cash in a way that it both
mirrors the most important characteristics of traditional cash, but also fulfils the expec-
tations which arise towards electronic means of payment. We analyse the problems and
trade-offs between the different characteristics to be implemented. This analysis is based
on a user survey and a review of existing technologies for electronic payment systems.
Finally we argue why existing systems do not fulfil the critical requirements, and point
out future work towards electronic cash which will meet more requirements.
1 Introduction
Electronic cash in our sense is universally usable stored value1. Electronic cash is
discussed as a means to replace traditional cash in the physical world, and as a
means of payment in the virtual world. In both cases, electronic cash could have a
number of benefits even compared to future pay-now2 or post-payment instru-
ments. Examples include that a stored-value payment might be cheaper than a
pay-now mechanism, because less on-line connections are required, and that, un-
like post-payments, everybody can use it independently of creditworthiness. Fur-
thermore, the payer’s privacy can be protected. For these reasons, existing
electronic payment instruments do not cover the whole potential market of elec-
tronic payments, i.e., a benefit for the issuers of electronic cash is the possibility
of earning fees by conquering a larger share of the market of electronic payments.
In order to replace traditional cash, electronic cash should be easily usable and
also offer robustness, off-line usability and transferability. Up to now no elec-
tronic cash system offers these characteristics. This leads to the question whether
it is possible to develop electronic cash with most characteristics of today’s cash,
i.e., electronic cash which may eventually replace traditional cash.
                                                
1 Besides electronic cash (i.e., prepaid stored value), we consider debit-card-like pay-now and
credit-card-like post-payment schemes.
2 Note that in all existing debit-card schemes debiting the account is deferred. Therefore, they are
post-payment schemes in our sense. This, however, may not hold for future developments
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2Before we describe those characteristics of traditional cash which will need to
be mirrored, we will describe the projected benefits of electronic cash. Then, we
sketch additional requirements, such as loss-tolerance, which are not fulfilled by
traditional cash but should be provided by electronic cash. After a short survey
over the existing technology for electronic cash, we discuss the problems which
occur if one wants to provide all desirable characteristics.
Note that this is no survey on electronic payment schemes3: As we will
show, no system exists which offers electronic cash in our sense and only few
schemes come close. Therefore, we rather survey technologies, existing building
blocks, and trade-offs which become important when designing electronic cash.
2 Projected Benefits of Electronic Cash
Our interviews with the banking industry have shown that electronic payments
have not yet turned out to be profitable. However, compared to traditional pay-
ment instruments, electronic payment schemes seem worth investigating for the
following reasons:
• Today's costs of handling money (especially coins) are significant, in particular
with vending machines. Thus a cheap form of payments is sought. This cost
reduction may even be extended if many subsequent transfers can be done
without the involvement of the banks.
• Convenient payments of any amount, i.e., no problems with missing change.
• It is possible to design electronic means of payment more secure than tradi-
tional cash. So the damage of counterfeit money might be reduced.
Using electronic cash as a form of electronic payment has additional benefits:
• With today’s technology, privacy in the sense of untraceable electronic transac-
tions can only be granted with electronic cash, unless one uses anonymous ac-
counts, which in most countries are politically not acceptable.
• The off-line usability of electronic cash reduces costs for lines or radio net-
works.  In particular it is being hoped that the costs per individual payment in
an off-line system can be reduced if the merchants submit collected batches of
transactions overnight.
• Issuers can earn fees by “conquering the cash market”.
• Interest can be earned from the float, which, e.g., can be used to pay interest to
the holders of electronic cash.
Also, the benefits of pay-now payment instruments hold:
• Sellers require irrevocability, e.g., in electronic commerce, which in general is
not provided by post-pay payment schemes where the payer can demand can-
cellation.
                                                
3 For surveys on digital payment schemes (which partially claim to be electronic cash), one may
look at Asokan, Janson, Steiner, Waidner 1997, Furche and Wrightson 1996, Mahony, Peirce,
Tewary 1998, or Wayner 1997.
3• Pay-now instruments can be given to less creditworthy individuals than, e.g.,
credit cards.
• By developing alternatives to credit cards and paper cheques, it should be pos-
sible to reduce transaction costs as well by limiting fraud and reducing handling
costs for cheques.
These benefits can only be earned if traditional cash can be replaced to a substan-
tial degree, and if electronic cash can provide efficient solutions on electronic net-
works. Thus a powerful tool is required, having the advantages of traditional cash,
but being transferable across networks as well.
3 Which Characteristics Should Electronic Cash
Have?
3.1 Characteristics of Traditional Cash
In order to replace traditional cash it is important to recognise which characteris-
tics traditional cash has: For any payment system named “cash” it is crucial to
mirror the expected characteristics. Otherwise, part of the cash market cannot be
reached and users may be disappointed if something is called “cash” but cannot
fulfil the expected role.
Usability
Usability means very basically to be able to use a means of payment, i.e., that eve-
rybody can obtain it, store it, and pay any payee with it. To fulfil this characteris-
tic is not trivial. A user of the world’s earliest stored value chip card in Biel,
Switzerland, concluded already in 1993: “Cash can be used everywhere, but the
card not. You need devices to read it.”4 Also think of the usability by children.
Ease of use is an obvious requirement for any form of payment. The handling of
coins is easy, except if appropriate change needs to be given. Also for the recipient
of large numbers of coins their handling is difficult. Usability of electronic cash
would be hindered if implementations are not compatible, e.g., if electronic cash
from one issuer is not usable with vending machines accepting stored value from
another issuer.
An obvious aspect of usability is portability. A card reader or an electronic
wallet must fit into existing leather wallets, men said in our surveys, or be of com-
pact shape to be put into pockets (women have less problems with storing such
somewhat larger devices). Also, of course, any form of electronic cash to be used
on the Internet is not well portable if stored on hard disks of personal computers.
                                                
4 The requirements and benefits of electronic cash in this paper are based on expert interviews
and consumer surveys. The interviews mentioned have been made in the framework of three re-
search projects, which were “Soziale Determinanten der Entwicklung alternativer
POS-Zahlungssysteme” funded by Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, CAFE and SEMPER,
funded by the Commission of the European Communities.  See Furger et al. 1998 for the con-
sumer interviews.
4Off-line Usability
Traditional cash can be used off-line; similarly this is required from electronic cash.
This may change in case some day everybody and everything will always be on
the Internet: vending machines, for example, are increasingly being put on-line.
This is done so that the operator can easily learn when something has to be re-
plenished, or is out of order. But as today most payees are indeed not perma-
nently on-line, mostly because of communication costs, off-line usability is
required.
Off-line Transferability
By off-line transferability we mean that received cash can be used for another
payment without contacting the issuer. Coins and bank notes can very easily be
transferred off-line whereas electronic payments may not. Respondents know
they need off-line transferability, e.g. for “giving the children pocket money”,
“give one’s neighbour 20 pence to buy a pint of milk”, “pour boire” and asked:
“How do you put a tenner in somebody’s birthday card?” Someone from Biel
said: “But if I have 1000 sFr on the card, I cannot split them. I cannot transfer
them.” And added “If everybody had a reader...”
Off-line transferability is not only useful for private account holders, but also
for companies to have a means of payment to pay received money immediately.
Untraceability
Traditional cash provides privacy protection. Usage of coins means that transac-
tions cannot be traced by third parties. For banknotes this is only the case to a
smaller degree, as transactions can be linked using the note numbers. Today, sellers
often do not know the identity of a customer. In our surveys some stated that
“monetary affairs are primarily private affairs”. Others argued “I feel entitled of
the option of being anonymous when I choose to be”, or they want to “minimise
Big Brother’s surveillance of my expenditure”. Some French consider that privacy
protection is a matter of “liberté personelle”, a right to be enforced by the state.
Others argued they need privacy protection for paying goods which fell “off the
back of a lorry”, in order “to avoid payment of value added tax”, or for “bribery”.
Thus, a part of the cash market can only be covered by electronic cash with a high
degree of privacy protection.
For clarity, we distinguish two levels of anonymity (Chaum 1981), namely
“untraceability” and “pseudonymity”. “Untraceability” means that the issuer, the
acquirer and merchants cannot trace a payer, i.e. cannot tell whether two pay-
ments have been made by the same payer, not even in collaboration among each
other. “Pseudonymity” means that all transactions can be linked to pseudonyms,
where the pseudonyms cannot be linked to individuals if only few transactions use
the same pseudonym. Telephone cards that are sold anonymously can be like this.
In practice, however, these schemes enable identification if the pseudonyms are
used too often: Using the phone-card for many calls can lead to identification by
examining the destinations of the calls.
5Transparency of Financial Status
From a simple look into one’s traditional wallet, one learns the remaining funds,
i.e., obtains transparency of the financial status. “With cash I can see precisely
how I run out of it.” “With cash, children can see the amount,” respondents said.
As opposed to other payment instruments, with cash a payer can easily be unable
to pay even though there is enough money on his/her bank account, so this look
“into one’s pocket” is of crucial importance. If the display is with the merchant,
this is no sufficient solution as of course users will wish to take this look any-
where. It is particularly annoying if one detects only after queuing that the funds
are not sufficient.
Control over Wallets
Traditional wallets remain in one's hands. If a purse on a chip card is used, this
chip card may be used for storing other functions as well, such as other payment
functions, or a digital signature function to be used in electronic commerce. There-
fore, users may not wish to hand over such an important card to a payee while
entering the PIN into the payee’s device. In case of terminals out of which the
holders cannot always extract the card, one may lose important functions if the
terminal erroneously withdraws the card.
Long validity
There are three types of validity of cash. First, cash is sometimes made invalid if
more secure coins and notes have been produced. Secondly, cash may no longer be
valid because the issuer went bankrupt (cf. Japanese Ministry of Finance 1989).
Issuers of electronic cash usually limit the usability of their cash right from the
beginning, in order to prevent long liabilities. Finally, the validity of cash may de-
crease due to inflation. Competition among different electronic currencies could,
however, reduce inflation because only those will survive which provide a low rate
of inflation  (cf. Hayek 1977).
Security
Apart from the issuers who will protect electronic cash against fraud, also the us-
ers want to be sure that the issuer cannot deny the value of the user’s cash.
The production costs of today’s coins with smallest denomination is often higher
than their face value. So there is obviously no risk of counterfeit money. Coins and
notes of higher denominations are more or less secure if the cost of forgery is kept
ahead of its gain: When colour-copiers became a cheap means to forge bank notes,
many countries increased security by introducing holographic images which cannot
be copied.
6Robustness
Both coins and bank notes are very robust. Similarly, high robustness will be re-
quired from electronic cash. Money should neither disappear nor become unread-
able. The demands regarding robustness are quite high, as users will compare it to
an embossed plastic card, i.e. a credit card, which can be used quite reliably in
many countries and climates. Men will bend plastic chip cards when in their hip
pockets. Electronic wallets may be stepped on or dropped. Also anticipated mal-
functioning of the electronic cash system should not result in loss of the users’
values.
Cost Efficiency
The costs of traditional cash is a subject which is difficult to treat as often its
costs are not known by the players, and also not published well by the banking
system. In any case, electronic cash needs not be free, as traditional cash is not
either. However, users may believe it is, or believe it is very cheap, because it is
being provided by the banking system at little visible costs. So regarding costs us-
ers will be very sensitive. Merchants may be used to paying a disagio when ac-
cepting card payments. But individuals will probably find it unacceptable if
electronic cash diminishes when transferred between individuals. In any case, a
new instrument will have to be either as cheap as traditional cash, or the marginal
cost increase must be justified by some other benefit.
3.2 Additional Requirements for Electronic Cash
We now give an overview of new requirements which are expected from electronic
cash. As compared to existing characteristics, if a new requirement is not fulfilled,
this type of electronic cash will not automatically look inferior to traditional cash.
So users will not expect that all new requirements are fulfilled. The new character-
istics may, however, form an incentive to switch from traditional to electronic
cash.
Fungibility
It will be expected that with electronic cash one can pay any particular sum easily,
just as one can with post- or pre-pay cards, bank transfer orders etc. This means
that if one has the necessary funds available, the system should not tell that the
desired payment is impossible. So electronic cash could be better than traditional
cash, where one may not be able to pay because the merchant has no appropriate
change.
Usability on Networks
From electronic means of payment it will be required that they can be used se-
curely on networks such as the Internet.
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Tolerance against loss, theft and malfunctioning has been a selling argument for
post-pay cards, so users will welcome it for electronic cash as well. Loss tolerance
could even be used to design an electronic traveller's cheque. Alternatively, one can
try to teach users that regarding loss electronic cash is like traditional cash. The
holder, however, will arrive at the conclusion that in case of loss of a card that can
only be used by the holder, the issuer still has the real money, and accordingly will
expect a refund.
Usability Across Borders
This is a characteristic not well available with traditional cash, if not even illegal,
but it may be expected from electronic cash, just as it is available with credit cards.
It is particularly valuable for travellers, in small countries, in border regions and in
trans-border electronic commerce. Currently, the issuers of the stored value cards
deployed in European countries face the problem that their kind of electronic cash
will not be able to inter-operate even though most of them will soon use “Euros”,
as the systems are incompatible.
Ease of Reloading
If users are required to go to a cash dispenser for withdrawing electronic cash, they
may consider withdrawing traditional cash instead, which can be used everywhere,
at least inside the country (expert interviews, see also Furger et al. 1998). Also,
users will require that reloading does not take much longer than withdrawing tradi-
tional cash or any other transaction. Reloading via network or phone from any-
where will certainly be useful (cf. Intellect 1996).
User-Friendliness and Trustworthiness
Systems must be designed in a way that they can be understood and handled
properly. Users will not develop trust in the system if they believe that the sys-
tem may not operate in the way they expect it. Thus, e.g.,  in the case of untrace-
ability users expect that no additional information of the users is given to the
payee during payment. It might be that a secure and correct system is not used
because people just do not trust the system to be secure.
Backwards Compatibility
This requirement originates from the manufacturers and operators of card payment
systems who argue that new payment instruments should have the form of a card
so that existing card readers can be used. In the past, the argument suffered from
the fact that card terminals were not able to read chip cards anyway, or were not
able to deal with the technology in question. Thus it was not really convincing
why new interfaces were not considered by major issuers.
84 Existing Technology
This section gives an overview of some existing technologies which can be used for
electronic cash. First some basic technologies are introduced, then different types
of cash-like payment systems with special techniques are discussed.
4.1 Basic Technologies for Cash-like Payment Systems
Tamper-Resistant Hardware
Electronic cash is represented by electronically stored data, which can usually be
copied very easily. To prevent criminals from simply copying electronic cash, one
possibility is to use special hardware. Silicon chips can be designed in a way that
it is difficult to access and manipulate their memory (Rankl, Effing 1997; see We-
ber 1997 for the emergence of chip cards in Europe). European stored-value phone
cards and cards for access to television were the first to exploit this difficulty on a
large scale, and the first to have been broken. Chips can be attacked with sophisti-
cated laboratory equipment (Anderson, Kuhn, 1996; Boneh et al. 1997). However,
more powerful intrusion detection systems are becoming available but they result
in modules thicker than chip cards.
Trustworthy User Devices
Achieving trust into user devices is difficult5 but required for electronic cash: Us-
ers need not trust devices from a supplier of the issuer’s choice and vice versa. A
cure is the so-called “wallet with observer” concept (Chaum 1992). The basic idea
is that the user has a trusted wallet of his choice. Each issuer who wants to equip a
user with a device then provides a plug-in module for the user’s trusted wallet in-
stead of issuing a new device. For electronic cash, the user’s wallet is trusted by
the user and guarantees the user’s security and privacy whereas the plug-in mod-
ule, which is trusted by the issuer, protects the issuer’s security.
In addition to multiple modules trusted by different parties, the wallet also
needs a trustworthy display and keypad: If the user's device has neither a display
not a keypad, the users have no control over the amount paid: After entering a
PIN into the payee’s terminal, the payee could deduct arbitrary amounts from the
wallet without the user being able to prevent it.
An additional advantage of such a wallet is that contact-less interfaces could
be used, such as radio, inductive or infra-red. This would make terminals possible
which are both cheap and well-protected against vandalism. They would need no
slots and could be under the ceiling or under glass if necessary.
                                                
5 Some means to achieve this trust are described in Pfitzmann et al. 1997.
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Authentication is required to guarantee that communication is done with the right
persons or devices. If money is for example withdrawn from an account to reload a
user's device, the issuer wants to be sure that this device really belongs to the per-
son owning the account. This problem can be solved by authentication schemes. A
strong kind of authentication is the use of signatures.
Digital Signature Functions and Blinding
Digital signatures allow to prove the authenticity of messages to other parties such
as courts. A digital signature on a message is produced with a so-called secret key
and can then be checked by anybody with a corresponding public key which is
linked to the signer’s name (see Merkle 1974; Diffie, Hellman 1976; Rivest,
Shamir, Adleman 1978). Unless substantial discoveries are made in mathematics, it
is computationally infeasible to break signatures, and, of course, if the secret key
is stored and accessed securely. An issuer could use a digital signature to sign any
document, thus also an electronic coin or bank note.
Signed documents can, of course, in principle be traced. In order to achieve
privacy, Chaum suggested to “blind” the signatures for making untraceable pay-
ments. Blinding means that some blinding factor is calculated into the electronic
cash to be signed by the issuer. After signing, the blinding factor is removed by the
holder. Thus the piece of money remains signed, but the issuer has not seen the
signature which comes back after payment (Chaum 1983).
Connection Anonymity
If a payment is made on a network, the network operators can trace the transac-
tion, whether blinding is used or not. A remedy would be to use anonymous ter-
minals or to use network anonymity services (e.g., MIXes, see Chaum 1981).
Loss Tolerance
To build loss tolerant systems, backups of electronic cash can be kept by the is-
suer. In case of untraceable electronic cash, loss tolerance can be provided if the
user either stores back-up information itself, or keeps it encrypted with a trust-
worthy party (Pfitzmann, Waidner 1990 and 1997). Essentially this information
can be used to reclaim unspent cash which is determined by unblinding all recently
withdrawn coins of this user.
Interest
Users might wish to earn interest on the amount of electronic cash that they keep
unspent on their devices. In a simple solution a user can pay the unspent amount
back to the issuer, whenever (s)he likes. The issuer credits interest on money that
is left since the last withdrawal. However, the issuer needs a mechanism to see
that this money was withdrawn by the user and not received from someone else.
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4.2 Coin-based Payment Systems
We distinguish between coin-based and counter-based payment systems6. Like
traditional coins, electronic coins are of a fixed value. To assure that coins can only
be created by the issuer, the coins are digitally signed. In order to offer untrace-
ability blind signature schemes can be used. Such coins can be very secure, but
they come with the problem of low fungibility. Some improvements can solve or
reduce these problems, but first some general extensions are shown.
Double-Spender Detection
There exists no software solution that protects electronic cash from being copied
and used twice. This is the reason why on-line verification or tamper-resistant
hardware is typically required for off-line use.
But security needs not depend on tamper resistance only, as there are solu-
tions to identify a criminal who spent a value more than once after breaking the
tamper resistance. Even if blind signatures are used, double spenders can be identi-
fied if an identity is encrypted into electronic coins (Chaum, Fiat, Naor 1990) so
that the identity can only be decrypted if the coin was used twice.
Value-less Coins for Transferability
A value-less coin can be used to authenticate a message once while staying un-
traceable. Double-use leads to identification.  This technique (Antwerpen, van
1990) is used to allow off-line transferability for untraceable electronic cash. The
recipient of a transferred coin needs a value-less coin which is then linked to the
received coin during the payment. For paying, the recipient forwards the received
coin and then “pays” the value-less coin. The recipient verifies the link to the coin
with value. In all following transfers the coin together with a growing list of linked
value-less coins will be forwarded. After deposit, the coin together with the linked
chain of value-less coins can be used to identify double users with the usual
mechanisms.
The size of the transferred coins grow, because each transfer adds one value-
less coin which is approximately the same size as the coin. A theoretically proven
lower limit for the size of growth in each transfer is the amount of data needed to
store the encrypted unique identity of the payers (Chaum, Pedersen 1993).
Schemes for Paying Interest with Coins
For paying interest on coins Chaum (1989) introduced two methods: time-stamps
and receipts. In the first method, coins have a dynamic value that increases like
money on an account on which interest is paid. Therefore the date of issue is
„minted“ into the coins. The actual value of a coin would be the issued value plus
the age of the coin multiplied by the rate of interest.
                                                
6 We don’t consider cheques because normally they are not pre-paid and otherwise, they are
similar to divisible coins.
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Coin-Extensions for Fungibility
Change: Coins are of a fixed value. This leads to the problem of a lack of coins in
the appropriate denominations. In traditional systems payers and payees have a
reservoir of change for this reason. This solutions cannot be used in untraceable
systems without payee untraceability. If, for example, an anonymous buyer pays
a merchant, the problem is that the merchant knows which change (s)he gives to
the buyer. If no transferability is offered the buyer has to give the change to the
acquirer. In co-operation with the acquirer the merchant can then find out the iden-
tity of the buyer, because the buyer is now in the payee-role, for which no ano-
nymity is offered.
Divisibility: Okamoto and Ohta (1992, cf. Chan, Frankel, Tsiounis 1998 for an
improved protocol) suggested divisible coins, where each coin can be spent incre-
mentally up to its monetary value. So one can pay $1 using a $10 coin and keeping
$9 for other payments of different values. A drawback is that all fragments of one
coin can be linked, which decreases untraceability.
Refund: Cheques have the advantage that the payer can write the amount the
payee wants to have into it while paying. Chaum, Fiat and Naor (1990) describe
such a system with pre-paid coins. The user withdraws „high-value“ coins from
the issuer and can decide what amount up to the coin value they would like to
spend. After having paid the user requests the issuer to pay the refund of the dif-
ference between the coin value and the paid amount. If there are a number of pay-
ments and deposits of the same amount, issuer and acquirer cannot link them.
Another possibility to increase fungibility is to combine coins with counter-based
systems, as shown below.
4.3 Counter-Based Payment Systems
In counter-based payment systems, the electronic cash a person owns is repre-
sented by a counter. Tamper resistance is required to keep the users from ma-
nipulating the counter easily. Also authentication schemes are required to prevent
illegitimate communication with the counter in order to change its value. So termi-
nals of issuers and merchants need special keys to access a counter on a user’s
smart card. Untraceability may be provided if communications with all smart cards
can be done with the same key which must be kept secret using tamper-resistant
hardware in the terminals. If for security reasons, different keys are used, only
pseudonymity can be provided, because each key can be used as a pseudonym.
A way to increase security in counter-based systems and to detect spending
of not withdrawn value is to track the value of each counter at the issuer. In off-
line systems this might not always be the actual value, but it can be updated from
time to time and used to detect if the counter stored on the smart card has been
manipulated, i.e., if its shadow shows a negative amount. A centrally stored
counter stands in conflict with untraceability, because all transactions are linked to
specific counters. Pseudonymity can still be reached if the counters cannot be
linked to individuals.
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Shadow counters can also be seen as backups to provide tolerance against
loss, theft and malfunctioning. In most existing systems, however, loss tolerance is
not communicated to the holders in order to keep costs for help-desks low
(“yesterday the Coke machine did not work, I want my money back”).
4.4 Hybrid Schemes — In Between Coins and Counters
Counters with Value-Less Coins
A way to provide untraceability while using asymmetric authentication techniques
is to use value-less coins for the authentication of payments: To increase the secu-
rity in counter-based systems, one can combine counters with electronic cheques
(Bos, Chaum 1990). For each payment an electronic cheque with the signature of
the issuer is needed. Because each cheque can only be used up to a maximum
amount, it is not possible to spend an unlimited amount of money without con-
tacting the issuer, after the counter is broken (CAFE report 1996).
Multi-Use: To save storage space on smart cards there are techniques for using
the same value-less coin multiple times (CAFE report 19967). Thus, depending on
how often a cheque can be used, the system provides something in between un-
traceability if the cheque can only be used once and pseudonymity if the cheque
can be used arbitrarily often.
Tick payment:  If all payments are to be made to the same payee, such as per tick
with a telecom provider, one single value-less coin (signature) needs to be used.
After an initialisation, one pays subsequent ticks quickly (Pedersen 1995).
Adding Value to Value-Less Coins: If one replaces the value-less coins with
coins with an upper and lower value limit, one can slightly increase the security of
the scheme since one has to pay the lower limit of the range for withdrawing the
coins which can then, depending on the value of the counter, be used up to the
maximum amount. Consider, for example, that the minimum and maximum amount
only differ by 10 cents, then, the gain of breaking tamper resistance is limited to
10 cents per payment.
Coin Pools with Counter
The problem to have coins in the right denominations can also be solved by coin
pools8. The user has many coins in all denominations but (s)he is only allowed to
spend coins up to the value of the counter. If tamper resistance is broken, the user
can spend all coins in the pool once without being identified. For coins the user
reloads next time, (s)he has to pay. So the possible damage by breaking the tamper
resistance is limited to the amount in the coin pool and a criminal would probably
get less money than breaking the tamper resistance costs.
                                                
7 In CAFE, the cheques could be spent twice. Thus it was possible to have 70 payments on a
card chip.
8 Personal communication with David Chaum.
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5 Trade-offs in Designing Electronic Cash
Now we examine the most important trade-offs, which emerge when different
characteristics are implemented in one system. First all trade-offs with costs are
discussed. After this all remaining trade-offs with security, untraceability and con-
venience are examined.
5.1 Trade-offs with Costs
Cost efficiency is always required. An electronic cash system will be only accept-
able if costs are low compared to the benefits it offers. So in all cases where the
fulfilment of characteristics costs money, such as for comfortable user-devices,
players should be willing to bear the cost if the benefits of using this kind of
money are large enough. Another possibility would be that the issuer expects
other benefits from the customer relationship and therefore bears the costs. We
believe that at the time of writing (1998) it has not been sufficiently investigated
whether the users are willing to pay for powerful systems having many useful
characteristics. It is not even clear how much a secure system offering many char-
acteristics will cost and whether these costs will be higher than the full costs of
traditional cash or other payment schemes.
For all values in use, issuers have to store information about them9, and the
values have to be transferred between issuers and users, even if the value is one
penny. Characteristics like off-line usability or off-line transferability require
complex protocols which make transaction times longer. Also additional hardware
will increase costs, like displays needed to provide users with more transparency
about their financial status.
More money can be spent to obtain more security: Secure protocols and tamper
resistant hardware have to be developed. In cases where a secret bank key has to
be stored very securely, much money can be spent for protection.
Untraceability makes everything more complicated: Untraceability comes with the
overhead for blinding. Untraceability in networks means anonymous connections,
which can be established by the use of anonymous terminals or the use of MIXes.
Both lead again to higher costs because of the additional hardware and, in the case
of MIXes, also of higher transaction times.
Regarding chipcard-based untraceable systems issuers emphasise the cost of
computation on the account holder side as a powerful processor is required which
costs more than a simple one. In the CAFE project, the marginal costs for a cryp-
tographic coprocessor were around US-$ 3.10 Potential issuers emphasised that
this was a major stumbling block. However, also the costs for handling all the sig-
natures have to be considered even though the costs must not be overestimated as
a large share of them can be handled off-line, i.e. after the actual payment.
                                                
9 Except in systems where only counters on user devices are used. But in such systems issuers
might not even recognise fraud.
10 Under the assumption that the chip card can be used for 3 years this can be expressed as privacy
for only one dollar per year.
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The more convenient a system gets, the more it costs: To achieve convenient re-
loading for users, many withdrawal terminals will be required. It would even be
better if phone and computers could be used for reloading as well. This, however,
requires techniques for managing passwords securely and approval on secure dis-
plays.
Robustness and reliability are costly and always limited: The system should also
be reliable so that one does not get frustrated by using it. To achieve reliability will
cost money. Electronic cash stored on portable devices will never reach the ro-
bustness of traditional coins. Water, heat and strong magnetism will quite likely
destroy electronic coins stored on user devices. Chip cards are known to be well
portable, but they face physical pressure when stored close to coins in traditional
wallets. Displays for achieving transparency need particular protection or get
scratches or even break. Spending more money, one can construct more robust de-
vices. On the other hand users might accept non-robust electronic cash if the de-
vices are not too expensive and convenient loss- and fault-tolerance is offered.
Fungibility for untraceable coin-based systems is difficult to achieve: A payment
should not be impossible because one ran out of appropriate coins. A solution not
requiring change is to use coins of the smallest denomination, e.g., 1 cent. This,
however, will lead to considerable memory and computing requirements, which in
turn will lead to problems with portability. Consider to store 100 ECU, which
means 10k coins. With current key sizes, a coin requires around 1 kbits, so one
needs 10 Mbits. Even though no storage problem for a pocket calculator-sized
wallet, spending, e.g., 2500 coins will still surpass its computational abilities. Fur-
thermore, 10 Mbits is beyond the storage capacity of chip cards which is largely
limited by the fact that men tend to sit on the cards, and accordingly the chips
have to be small. 20 to 25 mm2 is the largest size which comes into considera-
tion.11 A remedy would be to split coins or use multi-spendable coins which will
make some transactions traceable.
Loss tolerance comes with additional overhead: If loss tolerance is used, one needs
information for rebuilding the correct state, so this information needs to be han-
dled. In traceable systems this can be done by the issuer. In untraceable coin-
systems, users need a backup of the data that is used to create blinded coins
(Pfitzmann, Waidner 1997). Even if this backup has only to be done once at the
creation of the electronic purse it will make usage less convenient: One has to keep
a printout, a memory card, or remember the passphrase for decrypting the backup.
5.2 Trade-offs with Security
Perfect security is not possible: Apart from the risk that someone manages to break
the system with much effort and special equipment requiring considerable costs,
there will be always the risk that someone steals secret information like private
                                                
11 The latest card from EU project CASCADE can store 32 kBytes, but part of this will be
needed for the operating system and the program.
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keys for “minting” coins or circuit layouts to break the tamper-resistance of user
devices.
If electronic cash is generally used, breaking the system is not only a risk for
the issuer. Imagine a whole nation that is not able to do payments anymore be-
cause criminals produced lots of counterfeit money. It could already be problem-
atic if there are only rumours that the system has been broken. People might wish
to exchange their electronic cash into other values. This can lead to a cascading de-
fault by the inability of participants to pay off a close-of-day deficit, called sys-
temic risk (Bonorris 1997).
Trust in the system is required: People will only use new systems if they trust
them. The new protocols are difficult to understand, so it may take considerable
time and effort until trust has been established.
Untraceability means more costs for fighting fraud: In untraceable systems users
cannot be linked to transactions. This means that for criminals who have broken
the system it may be easy to stay anonymous.
Untraceable coin systems use blind signature schemes where the issuer does
not know which coins are used. For the issuer it would be very difficult to detect
criminals who “mint” their own coins. Only when more coins have been received
than issued fraud will become obvious.
More security results in more complex systems: A simple counter system that
only relies on tamper resistance will not cause any difficulties but in security. It
can be seen as a question of time until a given system with a certain technology for
providing tamper resistance is broken. Updating systems with the latest tamper-
resistance technology comes with regular costs and the management overhead for
expiring old user devices. If one enables the users of a counter-based system to
transfer amounts off-line, the issuer might not even detect that counterfeit money
is in use and it will be hardly possible to accuse someone of fraud. If tamper resis-
tance is not used alone, protocols become more complex to allow security and
other characteristics. This results in longer transaction times and more powerful
devices.
Coin-based systems can be designed in a very secure way and essentially
only the risks remain that the underlying cryptographic schemes are broken or that
the issuer loses control over its secret key. However, paying the proper amount
efficiently is a challenge. It also takes longer to load coins, as opposed to just up-
dating a balance of a counter. In a system of cheques with counters, one is in be-
tween.
The more characteristics a system offers the more risky is its security: It is a gen-
eral fact that the more complex a system is the more possible weak points it could
have which have been overlooked during development. So a paradox situation is
reached. Secure systems are getting more complex and may need additional fea-
tures like divisible coins in order to be fungible, what again leads to risks with se-
curity (Anderson 1994).
Full control over the wallet leads to a trade-off with security of the issuer: In con-
trast to the users, who don’t want that the devices from the issuer (e.g. card) can
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be withdrawn, the issuer might wish to have them withdrawn by a terminal if they
are suspect. Only in traceable systems, blacklisting helps.
Unlimited validity will not be offered by issuers: It is unknown how future fraud
with a given system security will develop. Issuers will not wish to have liabilities
in terms of value in the hand of holders for many years because criminals may
have broken the system and the damage may continue for years. To keep this risk
manageable, issuers limit the validity of cash or systems to a few years. This is
inconvenient as one may not be able to pay or as outdated value has to be ex-
changed in an on-line connection with the issuer.
Another disadvantage of long validity is that the issuer has to store more in-
formation for double spending detection or for loss tolerance.
Backward compatibility means compatibility with insecure systems: It is problem-
atic to be on the one hand compatible with old systems and on the other hand to
allow more security. This problem occurred for example with the German tele-
phone cards which have been broken. Even after more secure cards have been sold,
public phones still accept the old possibly broken cards, for the convenience of
honest users (taz 1998).
5.3 Trade-offs with Untraceability
Security: Using double spending detection in untraceable systems means also using
more complex protocols, where, e.g., the identity of a payer is added in encrypted
form to her/his electronic cash. Users might not trust the implementation regarding
that their identity is encrypted properly.
Without transferability special techniques are needed to keep the amount of re-
ceived electronic cash secret: If users do not have the possibility to transfer
money, they have to deposit it with the acquirer. The acquirer would therefore get
the information of how much electronic cash each person receives. Also suggested
solutions for transferability don’t offer full privacy. Using value-less coins means
that the issuer still gets the information of how many coins each user transfers.
This system is also forward-traceable, which means that a payer can recognise his
money if he sees it later in the chain of payments (Chaum, Pedersen 1993). An
easy method to hide somewhat the amount of received electronic cash is to pay
electronic cash to oneself, but nevertheless the bank could see the difference be-
tween the amount received and withdrawn. A better method would be to use
anonymous communication to exchange received electronic cash against new
spendable electronic cash anonymously.
Splitting coins for fungibility: This will lead to less privacy, as the coins derived
out of each other can be linked.
Backward compatibility with traceable systems decreases anonymity: The
“GeldKarte” in Germany comes for example with the problem that the new chip
was integrated on the old eurocheque cards that also store the user's identification.
The new chip would allow for pseudonymous payments, but the old information
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of the cheque-cards is nevertheless communicated to the payee and can in any case
be read by the terminals.
5.4 Trade-offs with Convenience
Convenience is a trade-off in itself: Offering additional features for a convenient
use of the system often leads to inconvenience somewhere else in the system. Al-
lowing for example users to transfer electronic cash will lead to more complex pro-
tocols and in the case of coin-systems to growing coins and thus larger devices
having more memory. In both, longer transaction times will be required or more
powerful and thus bigger computers. As one expert put it in our interviews: “And
then you need a little carriage to drag it behind you.”
Unlimited off-line transferability using double-spending detection in an untraceable
system is not possible: In addition to the problems of off-line usability alone, off-
line transferability using double-spending detection leads to growing coins. With
each transfer the encrypted identity of the actual payer has to be stored with the
electronic cash. Because memory to store the cash will always be limited, this cash
can only be transferred a limited number of times.
Alternatively, one would have to force holders to give certain pieces of value
which reached a limit of transfers back, i.e. differentiate between transferable and
unspendable money. The latter is not in line with today's rules of handling tradi-
tional cash, but not absurd, as received credit card payments or cheques cannot
immediately be used for payments either. However, it would have to be displayed
to the holder if money is unspendable.
Usability is always limited: It will be very difficult to make electronic cash as us-
able as traditional cash. There are devices needed to store and pay. Electricity will
always be required. So electronic cash systems will always suffer from an opera-
tional risk that payments are impossible because parts of the systems are down.
Some characteristics will make electronic cash more difficult to handle than
coins or credit cards. Think of electronic cash which cannot be spent since unlim-
ited transferability is not possible or the need to handle one’s electronic device
carefully.
An off-line transferable, loss-tolerant system doesn’t allow long validity: When the
issuer refunds electronic cash, which is claimed as lost by a user he cannot be sure
that the cash was not transferred to someone else and is still in use. To be sure
that the cash cannot be used later one has to wait until the electronic cash has be-
come invalid. It would not be loss-tolerant if refund can only be made after a long
time. On the other hand it makes no sense to speak of transferable cash if the va-
lidity of the electronic cash is very short and it has to be returned to the issuer or
acquirer after a short period. It would be also be very inconvenient for the user to
check every received amount of electronic cash whether it has to be returned soon.
Transparency of financial status versus size: Instead of carrying around a
“terminal” of one’s own with a PIN-pad and a display, roughly the size of a small
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pocket-calculator, it might be more convenient to just hand over the card or simply
insert it in a terminal.
Portability decreases functionality: The more computational power and special fea-
tures are required the bigger the devices become. To implement characteristics like
untraceability, off-line usability and transferability one might require more compu-
tational power than smart cards offer. A display and a keyboard would also be
required so that one needs not trust the devices of the payee.  A larger device may
even offer the facility to keep logs on all transaction and to use the data directly in
accounting software.
A possible solution which doesn’t require the user to carry an additional big-
ger device is to integrate payment functions in mobile phones or watches12. But
still then some people like children might not wish to carry expensive phones or
watches with them all the time, thus a payment could be impossible.
Fungibility with many coins of smallest denomination is time consuming: The ne-
cessity to reload many coins makes reloading and payment time-consuming and
inconvenient.13 In future systems, reloading is a minor problem: It could be eased
with faster devices or by reloading overnight via phone, or over the Internet. Still,
payments would remain a bottleneck.
6 Existing Systems
If one wishes to replace traditional cash, our surveys came to the conclusion that
one needs at least off-line usability, transferability and untraceability. Of course
we cannot estimate precisely how big the share of traditional cash is one could re-
place if these three characteristics are not fulfilled. But we believe the reader will
agree that these three are important characteristics. Today, there is not a single
implemented prototype fulfilling them all. All Internet payment schemes, such as
ecash, cannot be used off-line. All current smart-card purses neither provide un-
traceability nor transferability. Among all off-line usable systems ever built, only
Mondex14 provided15 transferability, and only CAFE fulfilled untraceability.
CAFE had limited transferability to “sibling” cards (e.g., for paying from parents
to children to the merchant).16
                                                
12 As PIN-pads on watches would have to be very small and thus difficult to use, a solution
would be to enter an amount elsewhere, transmit it to the watch, display it and have approval
on the watch with a small fingerprint reader.
13 In CAFE one had 1.1 second per signature at 7 MHz, including the time for unblinding.
14 The concept for NTT’s ncash (Kawahara 1998) provides transferability without anonymity but
it has not been built yet.
15 Transferability is no longer advertised on the Mondex Web-site, probably because issuers felt it
made the system less audible as in case of a manipulation it was not possible to record all
transactions made.
16 Digicash’s ecash requires on-line verification and, like all Internet payment mechanisms, does
not really provide untraceability since they do not provide connection anonymity as the payer
needs a TCP/IP address to establish a connection with the payee.
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7 Consequences
In the European deployments of stored value cards it became apparent that it is
very difficult to replace traditional cash. Except in a Mondex trial, holders were
not put into a position to transfer value to anybody who participates. Aiming at
paying with a vending machine or standing in a queue without knowing how much
funds are left is an inherent design problem to cards. Some issuers tried to accom-
modate for transparency by distributing card readers. Also usability restricted to a
nation seemed odd at times other cards are increasingly accepted abroad. Usability
of cards for payments over networks still is very seldomly seen.17 From our own
surveys we know that users are aware of the lack of functionality as compared to
traditional cash. Accordingly, Tim Jones, then CEO of Mondex, said “Cash is a
great product” (Financial Times of December 11/12, 1993). If one selects only
some of the characteristics required one can sell in certain niches. But such issuers
should not expect that they can replace traditional cash in general. It appears some
have been trapped by their own sales promotion telling that their brand is a better
form of traditional cash, with subsequent disappointment among holders, mer-
chants and issuers when it was not usable, did not provide privacy, was not
transparent, etc.
Wallets
Future electronic cash systems could, however, to a higher degree justify their
name. Electronic wallets could have several MB EEPROM, a display, and a key-
board which solves several problems at once: One could provide transparency.
One could store many coins. One could display how much funds one has and enter
a PIN on one’s own device. It would be possible to use the wallet-observer con-
cept. One could also put the initiative for paying into the wallet, so that untrusted
terminals cannot take money out. As compared to other payment instruments,
immediate, off-line, irrevocable, untraceable payments would be possible. With
low terminal costs, they can even be cost-effective for small sums.
Unfortunately very little experience has so far been made with wallet-like de-
vices because the semiconductor, plastic-card, and banking industries were locked
into the direction of using chip cards (Arthur 1989). The question arises if users
are willing to use larger devices and pay for them. First in-depth interviews with
300 frequent card users in five European countries indicate that these are willing to
pay ECU 15-50 for devices which replace several cards (Furger et al. 1998). Feed-
back from people who were demonstrated mock-ups was quite encouraging:
“That’s quite snazzy.”
“If I had a super gadget like this in my hands, of course I’d use it for a
whole variety of things.”
“It’s obvious that something like this is going to come eventually.”
“Could be something like a Swatch, the latest trend to have.”
                                                
17 The Dutch Telecom “KPN” trials a stored value card in the EU-project SEMPER for payments
over the Internet. See <www.semper.org>.
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“That’s the future, this kind of thing.”
However, no large trial was made so far18. The willingness to own such devices
may increase once users will wish to make digital signatures securely, i.e., see what
they sign, and enter approval on their own machines instead of on an untrust-
worthy machine, potentially infected by malicious code (cf. the German Digital
Signature Law, Bundesregierung 1997). This would render the usability of digital
signatures at different places possible, thus also at the point of sale. In order to
reduce the marginal costs of wallets, one could incorporate the payment and signa-
ture functions into other devices, such as pocket calculators, phone sets, car locks,
digital cameras and organisers (see Pfitzmann, Pfitzmann, Schunter, Waidner 1997,
Weber 1998) which people increasingly carry around anyway. With biometric
verification, in case only approval must be given, one would not need a keyboard
and then even watches could be used.
Coins in Cards
As the banking industry focuses on cards, one could attempt to put untraceable
electronic cash into a smart card, but without a counter. It might be possible to
design a coin system based on blind signatures using card chips. To minimise stor-
age space one can use divisible or multi-spendable coins. Privacy will suffer
somewhat because some payments will become linkable. Robustness, transpar-
ency and loss tolerance, however, will be as difficult to achieve as in any other
card system. Still, this could be a system with fairly low costs for the device on
the side of the holder. However, for usability balance readers will need to be sup-
plied, so why not build wallets in the first place?
Other
Besides the two approaches sketched, a third approach is to use more powerful
intrusion detection for tamper-resistant modules and rely less on signatures. Sys-
tems exist against which no attack is known. Today such carriers are thicker than
normal card chips. But issuers could rely more on tamper resistance than they do
today. A forth possibility might be to search for new cryptographic techniques.
Is Electronic Cash Possible?
Even with today's techniques it will be possible to bring more characteristics, like
off-line usability, transparency or untraceability, into new electronic cash sys-
tems. Untraceable systems for example would be much closer to our traditional
cash than existing card payment schemes. Such systems could also be cost effi-
cient for small values. However, to build a system offering all desirable characteris-
tics would currently still be a hard task, as the trade-offs have shown.
                                                
18 In CAFE only few transactions were made using the Infrared interface, and in the UBS St.
Moritz trial the radio interface was not very robust.
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Appendix: Electronic Wallets
Proposal for a multifunctional wallet, thin enough to fit into shirt pockets. With drawers
for smartcard security modules from telecom, railway company, savings banks, and certi-
fication authority. Size and functionality concluded from consumer research (cf. Özalp
1996).
CAFE-Wallet, with infra-red interface and
normal chip card interface.
Backside of a variant of multi-functional
wallet with opened drawer.
